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Abstract
The purpose of this contribution1 is to set up a language to evaluate the results
of concerted action among interdependent agents against predetermined prop-
erties that we can recognise as desirable from a deontic point of view. Unlike
the standard view of logics to reason about coalitionally rational action, the
capacity of a set of agents to take a rational decision will be restricted to what
we will call agreements, which can be seen as solution concepts to a depen-
dence structure present in a certain game. The language will identify those
agreements that act accordingly or disaccordingly with the desirable proper-
ties arbitrarily set up in the beginning, and will reveal, by logical reasoning, a
variety of structural properties of this type of collective action.
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1. Introduction
In the past decade much research in deontic logic has been aimed at incorpo-
rating agent interaction in the semantics of the classical operators of obligations,
forbiddance and permission. In philosophy John Horty’s Agency and Deontic
Logic has been a turning point for establishing a semantics of the deontic opera-
tors in terms of properties of strategic interaction, while the need of regulation
of Multi-Agent Systems in computer science has given rise to deontic exten-
sions of action languages, such as Sergot’s nC+ [2]. Generally speaking, in the
logical account of Multi-Agent interaction, it is often assumed that agents can
form coalitions, that is they can join forces to achieve a certain outcome. The
most commonly used logics for strategic interaction, such as Coalition Logic
(CL) [3], Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [4], Seeing To It That (STIT)
[5], are multi-modal logics where the central modal operator [C]ϕ (or similar
symbolism) is read as
1The present paper generalizes and significantly extends the conference paper on which it is
based [1], presented at the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science in
Fiesole, Italy.
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”the set of agents C can cooperate to achieve the property ϕ”
It goes without saying that if agents are allowed to join their forces their
capability of reaching a desirable state as well as an undesirable state increases,
and issues concerning its regulation crop up. However, various approaches
used in game theory [6] suggest that in strategic settings not all coalitions are
equally likely to form, for common interest in collective action may not arise.
As observed by social scientists [7, 8] the reason for a collective action is often
to be found in the interdependence among the agents taking part in that action.
As pointed out by [8, p. 161-162],
“Sociality obviously presupposes two or more agents in a com-
mon, shared world. A “Common World" implies that there is in-
terference among the actions and goals of the agents: the effects of
the action of one agent are relevant for the goals of another: i.e.,
they either favour the achievement or maintenance of some goals
of the other’s (positive interference), or threat some of them (negative
interference)” [. . . ].
In this paper we incorporate the study of dependence relations in the stan-
dard logical setting to reason about Multi-Agent interaction, i.e. situations in
which agents need other agents to satisfy their goals. Building on the work
in [9], we start from the observation that only if agents are endowed with the
capacity of negotiating their choices on the grounds of their dependence with
other agents, coalitions can be formed. To this purpose we will study the notion
of agreement, a transformation of the interaction structure that allows agents to
exchange favours, which can be seen as solution concept to the underlying de-
pendence structure 1. To say it with a slogan, in our logic the central operator
[C]ϕ should rather be read as
”the set of agents C can make a binding agreement to achieve the property ϕ”
Assuming the perspective of a designer of Multi-Agent Systems, the regula-
tion of the agreements that a coalition can give rise to becomes a crucial matter.
Indeed, we can find many examples of agreements violating system properties
that we recognize as desirable. Think of cartel formation, where more com-
panies, instead of competing to lower prices, agree on establishing a common
level of price; the aim of such collusion (also called the cartel agreement) is to
increase individual members’ profits by reducing competition. Here the role of
a deontic logic is to reason on these possibilities, and label them as forbidden.
In line with a solid tradition of deontic logic that dates back to Anderson
and Kanger (for a broad discussion see [10]), we will label certain outcomes
1Our notion of agreement is by no means the same as the one used in the bargaining literature,
see for instance [6], where players undergo a negotiation process about the allocation of a certain
resource. Rather, we see agreements as one-shot transformations taking place in a strategic normal
form game that consist of an exchange of favours among the participants.
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of an interaction as violations. The newly introduced notion of agreement,
confronted with this labelling, will acquire a deontic reading, on top of which
we can construct the semantics of the standard modal operators of permission,
forbiddance and obligation.
Paper Structure. The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide
an informal introduction to dependence theory and lay down the preliminary
definitions we will be using throughout the text. In Section 3 we provide a
formal representation of agreements in terms of effectivity functions — an ab-
stract representation of power — and preference relations, to be used in Section
4 to build the syntax and the semantics of a logic of agreements. In Section 5
the classical deontic operators are given a semantics in terms of agreements,
and an extension of the logic will allow to reason about desirable and undesir-
able coalitions. Logical and metalogical properties will be provided, showing
an application to game-theoretical scenarios. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dependence Theory and Agreements
The theory of dependence has conceptually been introduced in Multi-Agent
Systems in a series of works by Castelfranchi and colleagues [11, 8, 12]. At its
core lies the informal notion of dependence relation between two agents:
“i depends on j for achieving goal g"
The idea is that there are situations that an agent would like to be realized,
which we refer to as goals, for which however the contribution of other agents,
which we refer to as favour, is needed.
Recently, the results in [9] have shown that this conceptual framework can
be fully incorporated in the theory of games and the following example gives
an informal introduction to the kind of game-theoretic settings dependence
theory is interested in.
Example 1 ( Strangers on a Train ). In Patricia Highsmith’s novel2, Strangers on a
Train [13], that Alfred Hitchcock turned in 1951 into a movie with the same title, the
following story takes place:
Two protagonists wish to get out of an unhappy relationship. Architect
Guy Haines wants to get rid of his unfaithful wife, Miriam, in order to
marry the woman he loves, Anne Faulkner. Charles Anthony Bruno, a
psychopathic playboy, deeply desires his father’s death.
We can illustrate the setting with a two persons’ matrix as in Figure 1:
2We thank an anonymous reviewer of the tenth International Conference of Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2010)—publication [9]—for having brought this example to
our attention.
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N S O
N 2, 2 2, 0 9, 1
S 0, 2 0, 0 0, 1
O 1, 9 1, 0 8, 8
Figure 1: Strangers on a Train
N S O
N 2, 2 0, 2 1, 9
S 2, 0 0, 0 1, 0
O 9, 1 0, 1 8, 8
Figure 2: Agreement between the Strangers
Both agents have the same possibilities: either do nothing (N), commit the murder
of their own significant other (S), or commit the murder of the other person’s significant
other (O). For convenience we assign numerical values to the outcomes and we assume
that the payoffs are of the form (payoff(Guy), payoff(Bruno)), being Guy the Row agent
and Bruno the Column agent. Focusing on the choices of Guy (for Bruno the reasoning
is symmetric), N is the best choice he can make, for all possible decisions by Bruno—
technically N is a dominant strategy and (N,N) is a dominant strategy equilibrium
[6]—while this does not hold for S and O. To achieve the outcome (N,N) in the game, it
is fair to say that neither Guy depends on Bruno, nor vice versa. However the intuition
tells us that Guy would find it reasonable to kill Bruno’s father only if he knew that
Bruno would kill his wife, and viceversa. This would be possible if Guy could lend his
action of killing in exchange to Bruno’s one. If this outcome (O,O) were the outcome
to be selected, as we might expect, both agents would have to play a dominated strategy
which maximizes the opponent’s welfare.
The notion of agreement, seen in [9] as a simultaneous exchange of favours,
suggests itself. Along these lines, the story of the strangers takes an interesting
twist.
Example 2 (Strangers on a train (cont.)). On a train to see his wife,
Guy meets Bruno, who proposes the idea of exchange murders: Bruno will
kill Miriam if Guy kills Bruno’s father; neither of them will have a motive,
and the police will have no reason to suspect either of them.
If this agreement could take place then the game would be transformed in the one
pictured in Figure 2, the transposition of the matrix in Figure 1 under swap of strategies.
If this game were to be played, both agents would have incentive to stick to their
promise, i.e. to bring about the outcome resulting in (8, 8) which happens to be—in
economical terms—the outcome with the highest social welfare [6].
2.2. Cooperative Game Models
In this paper we depart from the game-theoretical framework proposed in
[9] abstractly representing strategic interactions by means of individual effectiv-
ity functions. Effectivity functions were first adopted in [3], in order to provide
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a representation of power of group of agents, otherwise called coalitions, in a
certain state.
Definition 1 (Individual effectivity functions). Given a set of agents N and a set
of worlds W, an individual effectivity function (from now on simply effectivity
function) is a function E : W → (N→ 22W ).
An effectivity function assigns, at each world, a set of sets of states to every
agent. If X ∈ E(w)(i) then the agent is said to be able to force or determine that
the next state after w will be some member of the set X. Intuitively if an agent
has this power, it can thus prevent that any state not in X (the complement of a
set A will be denoted by the set A) will be the next state, but it might not be able
to determine which state in X will be the next state. Possibly, some other agents
will have the power to refine the choice of i. We assume effectivity functions
to be outcome monotonic: i.e., for X ⊆ Y ⊆ W, if X ∈ E(w)(i) then Y ∈ E(w)(i).
Sometimes, to keep the description of an effectivity function manageable, it
is useful to use the operation Xsup on a set of sets X, that returns its superset
closure.
Let us describe the example of the strangers with individual effectivity
functions.
Example 3. Let w be a situation representing the game in Figure 1. We identify the
outcomes with their payoff vector instead of their corresponding strategy profile. Guy’s
effectivity function E(w)(G) amounts to his choices in the game closed under supersets,
that is
E(w)(G) = {{(2, 2), (2, 0), (9, 1)}, {(0, 2), (0, 0), (0, 1)}, {(1, 9), (1, 0), (8, 8)}}sup
while Bruno’s is
E(w)(B) = {{(2, 2), (0, 2), (1, 9)}, {(2, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0)}, {(9, 1), (0, 1), (8, 8)}}sup
For simplicity, when no ambiguity arises, we can name sets of outcomes, writing
for instance E(w)(G) = {N,S,O}sup. When instead ambiguity does arise we index
choices with agents, for instance we use NG to indicate that doing nothing is a choice
by Guy.
It will be useful to represent explicitly what happens to one’s effectivity
function if the opponents make a certain decision. To this end we define choice
restrictions.
Definition 2 (Choice restriction). Let E(w)(i) be i’s effectivity function at state w
and let X ⊆ W be a set. The choice restriction of E(w)(i) with X, in symbols
E(w)(i) u X, is the set {X ∩ Y | Y ∈ E(w)(i)}.
In strategic interaction, agents not only have powers, but also preferences.
Cooperative Game Frames are the kind of all-encompassing models we will be
dealing with in the rest of paper.
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Definition 3 (Cooperative Game Frames). Let N be a set of agents, W a set of
states, E an effectivity function on N and W, and i a preference total preorder for each
i ∈ N. We call the tuple (N,W,E,i) a Cooperative Game Frame.
A Cooperative Game Frame with a valuation function, i.e. a tuple (N,W,E,i
,V), for V be a valuation function over a set of a given set of atomic propositions,
will be referred to as a Cooperative Game Model.
3. Agreements and Coalitional Rationality
In this section we elaborate a model of agreements in terms of preferences
and effectivity functions. In doing so we will follow two paths:
␐ in the first (Section 3.1) we make use of a new notion of undomination
(originally from [14]), namely an undomination for someone else, as an
analogue of dominant strategy for someone else in dependence games.
␐ in the second (Section 3.2), we make use of the standard notion of un-
domination, originally introduced in[14] and a particular case of ours, as
an analogue of dominant strategy in strategic games. However, we com-
plement it with an operation on effectivity functions, to model permuted
games.
Finally, we investigate the assumptions under which these two representa-
tions are equivalent.
3.1. Coalitional rationality for someone else
Agreements [9] encode reciprocity among agents: every one plays in favour
of some agent and the favour will eventually be returned to him, not necessarily
by the same agent.
To this end we define a Pareto optimal choice for someone else, that selects
maxima in one’s order of choices. But unlike the textbook definition of Pareto
optimality [6], the maxima are considered in someone’s effectivity function,
according to someone else’s preference order. We limit ourselves to a for all -
for all type of preference lifting, meaning that we consider a set of outcomes
X preferred to another Y, when all outcomes in the former are preferred to
all outcomes in the latter, according to an underlying preference relation i or
its strict counterpart i — when this is the case we write X i Y and X i Y,
respectively.
Definition 4 (Pareto optimal choice for someone else). Let E be an effectivity
function, i, j ∈ N two agents, w ∈ W a state and X ∈ E(w)(i) a set in i’s effectiv-
ity function at state w. X is Pareto optimal choice by i for j (in symbols PO(i↪→ j)) at
w if, and only if, for no Y ∈ E(w)(i), Y  j X.
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The definition says that Pareto optimal choices for someone else are those
choices in an individual effectivity function such that no better choice exists
for another given agent. Despite their name, Pareto optimal choices for someone
else become standard Pareto optimal choices, i.e. for oneself , in case i and j
coincide. Let us have a look at Pareto optimal choices for someone else in the
example.
Example 4. In Figure 1 the choice N and the choice O are Pareto optimal choices by all
agents for themselves. As a consequence of outcome monotonicity of Pareto optimality,
we have that the only choice that is not individually optimal is S, both for Guy and
for Bruno. This simply means that the only choice that the strangers do not like in
an absolute sense is to kill their own significant other. Pareto optimality for the other
agent is even less informative: all three choices for both agents are Pareto optimal for the
other. Once again, Pareto optimality does not represent what agents should rationally
do taking the opponents into account, but what they should do in an absolute sense.
The example reiterates the fact, already noticed in [14], that the mere use of
Pareto optimality of choice cannot provide a good characterization of individ-
ually rational choice, and even less of rational choice for someone else. Once
again the limitations of Pareto optimality can be overcome by undominated
choices. Here the intuition is that a choice is undominated for agent j if it is Pareto
optimal for j no matter what the other agents decide to do. This is the formal
definition:
Definition 5 (Undomination for someone else). Let E be an effectivity function,
i, j ∈ N two agents, w ∈W a state and X ⊆W a set. X is an undominated choice by
i for j in w (in symbols XBi↪→ j,w)) if and only if
1. X ∈ E(w)(i)
2. for all
⋂
k, j Yk with Yk ∈ E(w)(k), X ∩
⋂
k, j Yk is Pareto Optimal for j in
E(w)(i) u Y.
The definition says that for a choice X in the effectivity function of agent i to
be undominated for agent j two conditions need to be satisfied: the first (item
1) that X is really a choice available to agent i and the second that there is no
better choice for agent j available to agent i (item 2).
Let us illustrate undominated choices for someone else in our motivating
example.
Example 5. In the effectivity function representing the game in Figure 1 the choice
of doing nothing (i.e. N) is an undominated choice by each agent for himself, while it
is not in the effectivity function representing the game in Figure 2, where instead the
choice of killing the other’s significant other (i.e. O) is undominated by each agent for
himself. However if we not only want to look at individual rationality, but also at what
agents could do for the others, we need to resort to undomination for someone else: the
choice O in Figure 1 is an undominated choice by each agent for its opponent and the
outcome (O,O), resulting from both agents helping each other can already be seen as a
possible agreement which both agents can give rise to.
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The example has made clear how favours, so central for the treatment of
agreements, can be naturally incorporated in our framework: i depends on j for
a choice X if j’s strategy in X is a favour for i or, said formally, is undominated
choice by j for i.
Before introducing them let us fix some notation. For a finite set X we denote
PERMX the set of all permutations over X. For a permutation sw : X→ X on X,
we denote PX(sw) the partition induced by permutation sw on X, and PX(sw)
the nonempty powerset of this partition, closed under finite unions. The fact
that a set Y ⊆ X is the union of some members of the partition induced by
sw will then be simply denoted with Y ∈ PX(sw). Whenever X is understood
the notation P(sw) will be adopted. Permutations form a group under the
operation of function composition and are therefore closed under composition
and inverse, i.e. for sw′, sw′′ ∈ PERMX, we have that sw′ ◦ sw′′ ∈ PERMX and
that sw′−1 ∈ PERMX.
Now we are ready to define agreements.
Definition 6 (Agreements and reciprocity). Let E be an effectivity function on W,
C ⊆ N a coalition, sw : C → C a permutation, w ∈ W a state defined on a given
Coalitional Game Model M. A tuple (
⋂
(Xi)i∈C, sw) with Xi ∈ E(w)(i) is said to be an
agreement for coalition C at w if
␐ XiB(i↪→sw−1(i),w).
The definition says that an agreement is a set of choices for members of a
coalition that are rational for some other member for that coalition.
3.2. Permuting effectivity functions
Another way of seeing agreements is as a reallocation of strategic ability
according to a certain pattern of dependence, exactly what happens in our
starting example when we perform a matrix permutation. In a Cooperative
Game Model, however, we can only use effectivity functions and preferences,
which are not enough to talk about permutations of effectivity functions. To
define them we need to endow those models with an operation of choice switch.
Definition 7 (Choice switch). Let E(w)(i) be a choice set of agent i at world w and
sw a permutation on N. Then E′(w)(i) is the choice switch for agent i at w following
permutation sw if E′(w)(i) = E(w)(sw(i)).
Basically, the choice switch assigns to an agent a new effectivity function,
according to a given permutation. For our purposes it is useful to dispose
of a global operation of choice switch, that reallocates effectivity functions
according to a certain permutation. We abbreviate with Esw(w) the choice set
E(w) constituted by the choice switches for each agent i at world w according
to permutation sw.
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Example 6. Let w be a situation representing the game in Figure 1 and let sw be a
permutation on the agents such that sw(G) = B. Bruno’s choice switch following sw
at w amounts to Guy’s choices in the picture, namely
E(w)(sw(G)) = E(w)(B) = {{(2, 2), (2, 0), (9, 1)}, {(0, 2), (0, 0), (0, 1)}, {(1, 9), (1, 0), (8, 8)}}sup
which is the effectivity function of Bruno in Figure 2, representing the game scenario
after the agreement is taken. For Guy the result is symmetric:
E(w)(sw(B)) = E(w)(G) = {{(2, 2), (0, 2), (1, 9)}, {(2, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0)}, {(9, 1), (0, 1), (8, 8)}}sup
A permuted individual effectivity function encodes a sort of candidate agree-
ment, i.e. a possible reallocation of agents’ strategic ability that does not take
preferences into account. To obtain a proper agreement we need to identify the
undominated choices for each agent at each permutation, i.e. what the agents
find it rational to achieve if they could choose for someone else.
Definition 8 (Agreements and permuted games). Let E be an effectivity function
on W, C ⊆ N a coalition, sw : C→ C a permutation, w ∈W a state defined on a given
Coalitional Game Model M. A tuple (
⋂
(Xi)i∈C, sw) with Xi ∈ E(w)(i) is said to be an
agreement for coalition C at world w if
␐ XiBsw−1(i),w in Esw(w).
The definition says that an agreement results from an exchange of strategies
of individual agents that are individually rational for the agents receiving them.
More specifically, the agreement is made by a set X that is an intersection of
sets indexed by the agents, and a permutation on the agents. Each part of this
set is an undominated choice of agent i in the effectivity function of the agent j
indicated by the permutation.
Let us observe how this works in our example.
Example 7. We can observe that the choice of doing nothing by Guy and by Bruno
are undominated choices in the effectivity function obtained from the game in Figure
1. This is because doing nothing, i.e. the profile (N,N) in the game, is a dominant
strategy equilibrium. Once, however, the effectivity functions are permuted, dominant
strategy equilibria also change. In the game of Figure 2, the choice to kill the other’s
significant other (the profile (O,O)) is now a dominant strategy. But given the previous
definitions. the choice of doing nothing is undominated for each agent and it is thereby,
together with the identity permutation, an agreement.
Agreements, formulated as undominated choices, inherit several properties
typical of undomination. The most representative one is that of monotonicity,
and its validity is shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (
⋂
(Xi)i∈C, sw) be an agreement for coalition C at a given state w.
Then each (Y, sw) such that
⋂
(Xi)i∈C ⊆ Y is an agreement for coalition C at w.
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Proof. By outcome monotonicity of effectivity functions and by the defini-
tion of the set Y, Y is such that Y =
⋂
(Yi)i∈C for Yi ∈ E(w)(sw(i)). But, as easy
to see, we also have that YiBsw(i),w in E(w)(sw(i)). This is enough to conclude,
following Definition 8, that (Y, sw) is an agreement. Q.E.D.
We have now two definitions of agreement, the one in Definition 8 and
the other in Definition 6. The following proposition shows that these two
definitions are in fact equivalent.
Proposition 2. Let E be an effectivity function on W, C ⊆ N a coalition, sw : C→ C
a permutation, X ⊆W a set of outcomes, w ∈W a state defined on a given Coalitional
Game Model M. The tuple (
⋂
(Xi)i∈C, sw) with Xi ∈ E(w)(i) is an agreement for C at
w in the sense of Definition 8 if and only if it is an agreement for C at w in the sense of
Definition 6.
Proof. It follows from the fact that Xi B(sw−1(i),w) in Esw(w) is equivalent to
XiB(i↪→sw−1(i),w) in E(w). Q.E.D.
The two ways of formalizing agreement with effectivity functions are now
fully disentangled and we can move on to their logical analysis.
4. A Logic for Agreements
In this section we introduce the syntax and the models for a modal lan-
guage to reason about agreements, providing a semantics to relate them. The
language, which we call L,[i],↓,sw, is an extension of propositional logic, with
modalities to talk about preferences (using i as reverse relation of i), single
agent choice restriction and permutation of effectivity functions. With a few
relatively small extensions, the logical language presented in [14] to reason on
undominated choices, turns out to be flexible enough to express dependence
relations, and also agreements.
Definition 9 (Syntax). Let Prop be a countable set of atomic propositions. The for-
mulas of L,[i],↓,sw have the following grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [i]ϕ | Aϕ | ^i ϕ | [i ↓ ϕ]ψ | [sw]ϕ
where p ∈ Prop and sw is a permutation on N. The informal reading of the
modalities is ”agent i can achieve ϕ”, ”ϕ is globally true”, ”there is a better
world than the current one for agent i that satisfies ϕ”, ”after agent i choses ϕ,
ψ holds”, ”permuting effectivity functions according to sw, leads to ϕ”.
The language is equipped with modalities to formalize both the agreements
that involve the permutation of the effectivity function — via the modality [sw],
that reasons on the consequences of effectivity functions permutation — and the
agreements that involve undomination for someone else — via the modalities
[i] and ^i , that reason respectively about the strategic ability of individual
agents and their preferences.
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Definition 10. Semantics
Let M be a CGM.
M,w |= p iff p ∈ V(w)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= [i]ϕ iff ϕM = {v ∈W |M, v |= ϕ} ∈ E(w)(i)
M,w |= Aϕ iff M, v |= ϕ, for all v ∈W
M,w |= ^i ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ, for some w′ with w i w′
M,w |= [i ↓ ψ]ϕ iff ψM ∈ E(w)(i) implies M ↓(i,ψM,w),w |= ϕ
M,w |= [sw]ϕ iff M|sw;w,w |= ϕ
The interpretation of all the operators, apart from [i ↓ ϕ] (the subgame op-
erator) and [sw] (the switch operator) which will be discussed next, is standard
from coalition and preference logics [15, 3].
4.1. The subgame operator
To model choice restrictions we introduce a modal expression of the form
[C ↓ ψ]ϕ
whose informal reading is: “in case coalition C chooses ψ, ϕ holds”, where ϕ
and ψ are formulas of the language L,,g,[C] extended with modalities of the
form [C ↓ ψ]. We define the dual 〈C ↓ ψ〉ϕ as an abbreviation of ¬[C ↓ ψ]¬ϕ.
Intuitively what we do is to talk about what holds in case the choice ψ of
coalition C is performed. Thanks to this operator formulas of the form
[C ↓ ψ][C]ϕ
allow us to talk of the restriction in the coalitional ability of C that is caused
by coalition C choosing ψ. This restriction clearly resembles the classical one of
subgame. For this reason it will be called the subgame operator.
Its formal interpretation goes as follows:
M,w |= [C ↓ ψ]ϕ⇔ ψM ∈ E(w)(C) implies M,w ↓(C,ψM)|= ϕ
The interpretation of the operator has a conditional reading: if a coalition
C has a certain choice ψM at w, then the world where this choice is actually
executed (w ↓(C,ψM), to be formally defined next) makes a certain proposition ϕ
true. Notice that the capacity of C to choose ψM is the precondition for C to
actually execute ψM.
The updated world w ↓(C,ψM) is so defined:
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␐ It inherits the same valuation function as w
␐ It updates the effectivity function E(w ↓(C,ψM)).
Definition 11. Let E be an effectivity function defined on a set of outcomes W and a
set of agents N and let C,C′ ⊆ N, X ⊆ W and w ∈ W. E(w ↓(C,X)) is defined in the
following way:
E(w ↓(C,X))(C′)  ({X})sup for C′ ∩ C , ∅
E(w ↓(C,X))(C′)  (E(w)(C′) u X)sup for C′ ∩ C = ∅ and C′ , ∅
E(w ↓(C,X))(C′)  E(w)(C′) for C′ = ∅
The way the relation is updated deserves some comment. A distinction is
made between the strategic ability update of the agents who made a certain
choice ψ and all the other agents. After coalition C has made a choice ψ, all
the coalitions involving agents belonging to C are given ({ψM})sup as a choice
set. This view maintains that a coalition comprising agents in the coalition that
has already chosen cannot further influence the outcome of the game. This fact
implies that the subgame operator is not superadditive, in the sense given in
[3], that is, bigger coalitions need not have bigger power. Said in other words,
we do not allow agents to make a choice within a certain coalition and then,
at the same time, to make a different choice within different coalitions. The
models of reference are strategic games, in which strategies are decided in the
beginning once and for all [6]. The other (nonempty) coalitions instead truly
update their choice set having it restricted by the choice of C. Restriction is
implemented in this case by intersecting the effectivity function with the move
that has been carried out. In case for instance C chooses to force ψ and C was
able to choose ξ, then given the choice by C, C is able to force ξ ∧ ψ. The
coalitional relation at worlds different from the one where the choice is made
remains instead unchanged. This means that the update is local. Again, the
references are strategic games, where the sequential structure of strategies is
substantially ignored. Notice also that by the last condition the empty coalition
never gains power. In sum the strategic ability update is governed by three
principles:
␐ the irrelevance of hybrid coalitions, that does not allow the members of
the coalition that moved to further influence the interaction,
␐ the restriction of opponents’ choices, that truly updates the effectivity
function of the coalitions opposing the one that moved,
␐ the locality of the update, that only updates the power of nonempty
coalitions at one world.
The update operation is treated as a function that takes a triple world-
coalition-set as a value and returns a world. A consequence is that the coalition
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frames are special frames that contain all instances of their updates. In other
words, they are closed under subgames .
Definition 12 (Closure under subgames). Let F = (W,E) be a coalition frame. F
is said to be closed under subgames if and only if X ∈ E(w)(C) implies that
w ↓(C,X)∈W.
This is a frame condition and, as many others that we have seen so far, can
be modally characterized.
Proposition 3. Let F = (W,E) be a coalition frame. The following holds:
F |= [C]ξ↔ 〈C ↓ ξ〉> if and only if F is closed under subgames.
Proof. From right to left, it is straightforward. From left to right assume
F |= [C]ξ ↔ 〈C ↓ ξ〉>. Consider now a set X ∈ E(w)(C) and take a valuation
function V such that ξM = X for some M based on F. By the assumptions we
have that M,w |= 〈C ↓ ξ〉>, which means that there is a world w ↓(C,ξM)∈W such
that M,w ↓(C,ξM)|= >, i.e. F is closed under subgames. Q.E.D.
4.2. The operator [sw], the switch operator
The operator [sw] accounts for the transformation in a model induced by
permuting agents’ effectivity functions. In the same way we have done with
the subgame operator (Definition 11) its interpretation is nonconstructive. Each
world w has an outcoming arrow labelled with a permutation sw on agents that
goes to another world w′ that is equivalent to w as to valuation function but
differs for the agents’ effectivity functions, that are reallocated according to sw.
Definition 13 (Switch).
M,w |= [sw]ϕ if and only if M, (sw,w) |= ϕ
The updated world (sw,w) is identical to w in all features apart from the
effectivity function, which is interpreted as follows:
Definition 14 (Updated worlds for switches).
E((sw,w))(i)  E(w)( j) if sw(i) = j
The clause regulating the update deserves a short comment. It says that
updating a world means updating its effectivity function, following the given
permutation. In other words, if agent j had choice set Y at world w, then at
world (sw,w) agent i will have Y whenever sw(i) = j. In turn the set X held by
agent i at w will be assigned at (sw,w) to agent sw−1(i).
As for the case of the subgame operator, coalition frames are special frames
that are closed under agents permutations. The closure can be made precise in the
following way.
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Definition 15 (Closure under agents permutations). Let w ∈W be a world,(sw,w)
its update according to permutation sw, and F = (W,E) be a coalition frame. F is said to
be closed under agents permutations if and only if w ∈W implies that (sw,w) ∈W.
As for the closure under subgames, it is a frame condition that can be
formally characterized.
Proposition 4. Let F = (W,E) be a coalition frame. The following holds:
F |= 〈sw〉> if and only if F is closed under agents permutations.
Proof. From right to left, it is straightforward. From left to right assume
F |= 〈sw〉>. Consider now a world w ∈ W and consider any permutation
sw : N→ N. We must have that (sw,w) ∈W. Q.E.D.
It is worth noticing that the switches we consider are total, while much
attention in the literature has been dedicated to partial agreements, that are
instead based on partial permutations [9]. We shall see that, exploiting the
features of outcome monotonicity of effectivity function and some other mild
assumptions, notions analogous to partial agreements can be defined even
when using total permutations.
4.3. Validities
The switch operator shares many structural features with the subgame oper-
ator. The most fundamental one is the presence of reduction axioms: also in this
case the introduction of the subgame operator does not add expressive power
to the language provided the models are closed under agents permutations.
Proposition 5 (Reduction Axioms). The axioms and the rules displayed in Table 1
are valid in Coalition Models.
A proof is to be found in the appendix (Section Appendix A).
To see more clearly how the reduction works it can be observed that any
formula with the switch operator occurring in it can be eventually rewritten
as a formula without the switch operator occurring in it, preserving validity.
Similar arguments are used in dynamic epistemic logics [16].
4.4. Characterization results
The coming results essentially concern the characterization power of the
language with respect to the notions defined at the structural level. With these
characterization results, which generalize and extend the ones in [14] to rational
choice for someone else, we can make use of the logical language to express
and reason about complex interactions between preferences and choices in
interdependence.
To start with, Pareto optimal choices for someone else, introduced in Defi-
nition 4, can be characterized within the language provided in Definition 9.
Proposition 6. ϕM is Pareto optimal choice by i for j in w if and only if M,w |=
[i]ϕ ∧ 〈i〉^j ϕ
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Axioms
A1 [sw]p↔ p
A2 [sw]¬ϕ↔ ¬[sw]ϕ
A3 [sw](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([sw]ϕ ∧ [sw]ψ)
A4 [sw][k]ϕ↔ [sw−1(k)]ϕ
A5 [sw]i ϕ↔ i ϕ
A6 [sw′][sw]ϕ↔ [sw′ ◦ sw]ϕ
Rules
R1 ϕ⇒ [sw]ϕ
Table 1: Axioms and rules for the switch operator
Proof. We show only one direction, the other follows a similar pattern. (⇒)
Let us assume that ϕM is Pareto optimal choice by i for j in w , i.e. that ϕM
is a Pareto optimal choice for agent j at world w in E(w)(i) according to the
(∀,∀) preference lifting. This means, by Definition 4, that for no X ∈ E(w)(i),
X (∀,∀)j ϕM and that ϕM ∈ E(w)(i). In turn this means that for all X ∈ E(w)(i)
∃x ∈ X,∃y ∈ ϕM, such that x  j y. By the definition of effectivity functions,
no set X ∈ E(w)(i) is such that X ⊆ (¬^j ϕ)M. So we can conclude that M,w |=
[i]ϕ ∧ 〈i〉^j ϕ. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 shows that saying that a choice ϕ is Pareto optimal for j boils
down to saying that it can be performed by an agent (i.e. [i]ϕ) and that the
agent cannot avoid ending up in a world that is worse for j than some ϕworld
(i.e. 〈i〉^j ϕ).
We know from [14] that Pareto optimal choices are particularly weak con-
structs that can however be refined by taking the opponents into account. [17]
has moreover shown that the opponents’ possibilities can be made formal by
using the subgame operator (Section 4.1). In the present case its use, together
with the previous result, makes for the possibility of characterizing the notion
of undominated choice for someone else.
In the same fashion as what done with the notion of undominated choice
[14] we put forward a variety of characterization results for undominated choice
for someone else, where the generalizations apply as sketched for the case of
Pareto optimal choices.
Proposition 7. Let F be the class of Cooperative Game Frames with individual effec-
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tivity functions closed under subgames and let F ∈ F be one of them. Let moreover
E(w)(i) =
⋂
E(w)( j)( for i , j) be a set of sets obtained by superadding the choice sets
of all opponents of agent i. The following holds:
F |= [i]ϕ→ [i ↓ ψ]([i](ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ 〈i〉∨i ^j (ϕ ∧ ψ))
if and only if each X ∈ E(w)(i) is such that X is undominated choice by i for j at w
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the one given in [18] for
standard undominated choices, and it allows for similar observations: i) in
characterizing undomination as a property of the frames, we do not need any
restriction on the choices of coalitions; ii) we can characterize a much finer
notion of undomination and Pareto optimality of choice: we can talk about all
sets in an effectivity function, and not only those that are the truth set of some
proposition.
If instead we would like to characterize undomination for someone else at
the model level, we need some more restrictive assumptions, namely finiteness
of effectivity functions.
Proposition 8. Let POi↪→ jϕ abbreviate the formula characterizing the fact that ϕ is a
Pareto optimal choices by i for j and let {ψ1, ..., ψn} = E(w)(i) = ⋂E(w)( j)( for i , j)
be the effectivity function of i’s opponents. The following holds:
ϕMBi↪→ j,w ⇔M,w |= ∧ψi∈{ψ1,...,ψn}[i ↓ ψi]POi↪→ j(ϕ ∧ ψi)
The proof is, once again, the generalization of the corresponding one for the
rational choice by an agent for himself [18]. In the same line of that proposition
it shows that with finite effectivity functions, undomination for someone else
can be written as a finite conjunction of formulas that make use of the subgame
operator and Pareto optimality for someone else. In other words it says that an
undominated choice for someone else is a Pareto optimal choice for someone
else in every choice restriction. As the latter ones are finitely many a finite
conjunction is sufficient to express the formula in the language.
The coming part will characterize agreements inside the language, using
all the machinery that we have introduced so far. It is moreover convenient,
to shorten notation, to abbreviate the syntactical correspondents of ϕMBi↪→ j,w
characterized in the previous propositions as [rational(i↪→ j)]ϕ.
4.4.1. Characterizing agreements
As anticipated, the introduction of the switch operator in the framework
makes it possible to characterize agreements without explicitly defining modal
operators capturing rationality for someone else. We carry out the characteri-
zation assuming finiteness of effectivity functions and the following definition
will ease the presentation of the result.
Definition 16. AC∧i∈C ϕi := ∨C∈P(sw)[sw]∧i∈C[rational(i↪→i)]ϕi
where
∨
C∈P(sw) means that the coalition C is a union of orbits of the cycles
induced by the permutation sw on N. This definition draws in a formal language
16
what a set of agents can agree upon: it says that a coalition can agree on∧
i∈C ϕi whenever there is a coalition C that can generate
∧
i∈C ϕi as a partial
agreement. Notice that the coalitional ability is defined in terms of a conjunction
of individually rational actions, which in turn quantify over all possible choices
of one’s opponents.
The syntactical and the model theoretical definition can now be related.
Proposition 9. Let M be a finite Coalitional Game Model closed under subgames and
agents permutations. We have that M,w |= AC∧i∈C ϕi ⇔ there exists a permutation
sw on C such that (
⋂
(ϕMi )i∈C, sw) is an agreement for C in w.
Proof. The result follows from Definition 16, Definition 8, Definition 5 and
Proposition 8. Q.E.D.
Using Proposition 2 also the following result is straightforward, providing
an alternative characterization of agreements in terms of undominated choices
for someone else without the switch operator.
Proposition 10. Let M be a finite Coalitional Game Model closed under subgames
and agents permutations. We have the following validity:
AC∧i∈C ϕi ↔ ∨C∈P(sw)∧i∈C[rational(i↪→sw(i))]ϕi
The series of syntactic expressions characterizing agreements has shown
that the language is powerful enough to account for transformations of agents’
strategic abilities following reciprocity cycles. The next section will label these
transformations in a deontic logic fashion, aiming at pointing to the desirable
ways of forming coalitions via agreements.
5. Deontic Operators
Our motivating example clearly emphasizes and external-systemic perspec-
tive on norms, as it describes a rational agreement going against desirable
properties.
Along these lines, outcomes will be labelled in accordance to their deontic
status and permutations will be judged against this labelling as follows:
␐ Permutations are forbidden if leading to undesired outcomes (violations);
␐ Permutations are permitted if not forbidden;
␐ Permutations are obliged in case all the other possible permutations are
forbidden.
The resemblance of the present definition with the one given in [14] for
norms on coalitional choices shows that agreements are treated as one possible
coalitional choice, and their regulation is inserted in a more general framework.
However there is a notable point of difference: coalitional choices are sets of
states, while agreements are sets of states endowed with a permutation on
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agents. What is more, the latter may be defined on a subset of the set of agents,
giving rise to partial agreements.
To bridge the gap we will exploit outcome monotonicity of effectivity func-
tions. We know that if a set X ⊆ violM in some model M belongs to the effectivity
function of some agent i at some world w then the set violM does as well. In
other words if an agent can make a choice that, no matter how the other agents
choose, will lead to a state in X ⊆ violM then it can also make a choice that, no
matter how the other agents choose, will lead to a violation.
Making use of this feature, we can apply the standard deontic operators to
permutations.
Definition 17 (Deontic Operators on Agreements). Let PERMN be the set of all
permutations on N and let sw ∈ PERMN. The operators F(sw),P(sw),O(sw) indicate
forbiddance, permission and obligation as follows.
F(sw) := [sw]
∨
i∈N ¬[rationali]¬viol
P(sw) := ¬F(sw)
O(sw) :=
∧
sw′∈PERMN,sw F(sw
′)
Norms are here used to label agents permutations. A permutation sw is
forbidden if after the corresponding switch for some agent the set (¬viol)M is
not a rational choice, it is permitted if it is not forbidden, and it is obligated if
all other permutations are forbidden.
The operator F(sw) and AC of Definition 16 show a form of duality. The
correspondence between the two will turn out to be even stricter when forbid-
dance is applied to coalitions and not to permutations only. For now we can
show some relation between the two. The following proposition states that
if some permutation is forbidden then the agents together can cooperate to
achieve an undesirable state.
Proposition 11. Let F be a finite Coalitional Game Model closed under subgames and
agents permutations. The following holds: F |= (∨sw∈PERMN F(sw))→ANviol
Proof. Assume M,w |= F(sw) for arbitrary M,w and for some permutation
sw on N, that is to say M,w |= [sw]∨i∈N ¬[rationali]¬viol. By the interpretation
of the modal operators, there is an agent sw−1(k) for which (¬viol)M is not an
undominated choice, i.e. for each of them there is a set X ∈ E(w)(sw−1(k)) for
which X sw−1(k) (¬viol)M. A fortiori X ⊆ violM and by outcome monotonicity
violM is undominated. As by outcome monotonicity>M is undominated, too, for
all j , sw−1(k), violM is a possible agreement of N. In other words M,w |= ANviol.
Q.E.D.
The following proposition states that if some permutation is permitted then
the agents together can cooperate to achieve a desirable state.
18
Proposition 12. Let F be a finite Coalitional Game Frame closed under subgames and
agents permutations. The following holds:
F |= (∨sw∈PERMN P(sw))→AN¬viol
Proof. It follows the same pattern of the previous result. Q.E.D.
In both cases the converse does not hold, as violM can be identical with the
whole domain or N may not be able to agree upon a desirable property.
The validities in this section have shown that the desirability of a potential
agreement — as well as its undesirability — always have some implications
in terms of rational action. In particular Proposition 11 states that if some
potential agreement is undesirable the grand coalition can rationally choose an
undesirable state, while Proposition 12 states that if some potential agreement
is permitted the grand coalition can rationally choose a desirable state.
The next section will lift these operators from permutations to coalitions.
5.1. A deontic logic for coalition formation
Speculating on the results of the choices that can be agreed upon by a
certain coalition, it is immediate to apply the deontic statements to coalitions
themselves. The idea is that coalition C is forbidden to form if and only if all
the agreements it can give rise to might not lead to a desirable outcome.
Definition 18 (Deontic Operators on Coalitions).
F(C) :=
∧
C∈P(sw)[sw]
∨
i∈C ¬[rationali]¬viol
P(C) := ¬F(C)
O(C) := F(C)
The operator F(C) says, as anticipated, that a coalition C should not form
if all agreements it can give rise to might not lead a desirable outcome; it
is permitted when it is not forbidden and it is obligated when the opposite
coalition is forbidden.
Notice that the expression
∧
C∈P(sw)[sw]
∨
i∈C ¬[rationali]¬viol due to the as-
sumption of finiteness of choices of coalitions can be described within the lan-
guage. The following reveals the intimate relation between the newly defined
forbiddance operator and the agreement modality:
Proposition 13. The following is a validity of any finite Coalitional Game Frame:
F(C)↔ ¬AC¬viol
Proof. From left to right, take an arbitrary M,w such that M,w |= F(C). By
definition of F(C), M,w |= ∧C∈P(sw)[sw]∨i∈C ¬[rationali]¬viol. This means that
for all permutations sw for which sw(C) = C there is some agent sw(k) ∈ C for
which (¬viol)M is not undominated in E(w)(k), which in turn means that there is
a set X ∈ E(w)(k) such that X sw(k) (¬viol)M. (Notice on the fly that X ⊆ violM.)
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But this means that M,w 6|= AC¬viol, i.e. M,w |= ¬AC¬viol. From right to left,
the proof is similar. Q.E.D.
The previous proposition states that forbidding a coalition is equivalent to
stating that that coalition cannot avoid agreeing on an undesirable property.
The following section is devoted to applying the full-blown modal apparatus
we have introduced to the example of the strangers in the train.
5.2. Colouring the strangers
The deontic operators defined in terms of agreements can be fruitfully used
to succinctly reason on the relevant properties of strategic interaction. This
section makes use of the characterization results obtained so far to reason on
the interaction of Figure 1. The same type of reasoning can be extended to all
interactions that can be described using single agent effectivity functions.
Proposition 14. Let M,w be a representation of the game in Figure 1. Let us assign
the atomic proposition viol to hold in the outcome (O,O). For G,B being Guy and
Bruno, x ∈ {G,B}, O,N,S the respective choices, the following formulas hold in M,w:
¬[rationalx]O agents do not find it rational to kill the other agent’s
significant other
¬[rationalx]S agents do not find it rational to kill their own significant
other
[rationalx]N agents do find it rational not to kill anyone
[(G,B), (B,G)][rationalx]O agents can agree to kill each other’s significant other
F((G,B), (B,G)) it is forbidden to swap murders
O((G,G), (B,B)) it is obligatory not to swap murders
P((G,G), (B,B)) it is permitted not to swap murders
The deontic operators precisely identify the transformations of the game struc-
ture leading to desirable and to undesirable consequences.
6. Conclusion
The contribution of the paper consists in developing a modal logic to express
dependence relations as first formalized in [9]. To that we add the machinery
of deontic logic, in order to discriminate between agreements that do and
agreements that do not reach some desirable properties set up in the beginning.
Unlike the standard logics to reason about coalitionally rational action, such
as ATL, STIT or CL, the capacity of a set of agents to take a rational decision
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have been restricted to what we have called agreements, and formalized as a
transformation of the interaction structure that exchanges favours, i.e. choices
that are rational for someone else, among agents.
Our language is based on the one we have studied in [14], which extends
Pauly’s Coalition Logic with preferences, to account for undominated choices.
We generalize the notion of undominated choice to that of undominated choice
for someone else and we consequently generalize all related characterization
results. We introduced an explicit operator to talk about effectivity function
permutations and showed a reduction result to the language without this op-
erator.
The deontic language has allowed us to identify those agreements that act
accordingly or disaccordingly with the desirable properties set up in the begin-
ning, and has revealed, by logical reasoning, a variety of structural properties
of this type of collective action.
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Appendix A. The switch operator: validities
[sw]p↔ p
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw]p⇔M, (sw,w) |= p⇔M,w |= p. Q.E.D.
[sw]¬ϕ↔ ¬[sw]ϕ
proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw]¬ϕ ⇔ M, (sw,w) |= ¬ϕ ⇔ M, (sw,w) 6|= ϕ ⇔
M,w 6|= [sw]ϕ⇔M,w |= ¬[sw]ϕ. Q.E.D.
[sw](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([sw]ϕ ∧ [sw]ψ)
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw](ϕ∧ψ)⇔M, (sw,w) |= ϕ∧ψ⇔M, (sw,w) |=
ϕ and M, (sw,w) |= ψ ⇔ M,w |= [sw]ϕ and M,w |= [sw]ψ ⇔ M,w |= [sw]ϕ ∧ [sw]ψ.
Q.E.D.
[sw]Aϕ↔ Aϕ
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw]Aϕ⇔ M, (sw,w) |= Aϕ⇔ ϕM = W ⇔ ϕM =
W ⇔M,w |= Aϕ. Q.E.D.
[sw]i ϕ↔ i ϕ
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw]i ϕ ⇔ M, (sw,w) |= i ϕ ⇔ M, sw(v) |=
ϕ for every v such that w i v ⇔ M, v |= ϕ for every v such that w i v ⇔ M,w |= i ϕ.
Q.E.D.
[sw][k]ϕ↔ [sw−1(k)]ϕ
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw][k]ϕ ⇔ M, (sw,w) |= [k]ϕ ⇔ ϕM ∈
E(sw(w))(k)⇔ ϕM ∈ E(w)( j), for sw(k) = j⇔M,w |= [sw−1k]ϕ. Q.E.D.
[sw][k ↓ ψ]ϕ↔ [sw−1(k) ↓ ψ]ϕ
Proof. Take arbitrary M,w. M,w |= [sw][k ↓ ψ]ϕ ⇔ M, (sw,w) |= [k ↓ ψ]ϕ ⇔
M, (sw,w) |= [k]ψ implies M ↓k,ψ,w, (sw,w) |= ϕ⇔M |= [sw−1(k)]ψ implies M ↓sw−1(k)(w),ψM |=
ϕ⇔M |= [sw−1(k) ↓ ψ]ϕ. Q.E.D.
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